讲座内容：Attorney Self-Interest, Tax Avoidance, and Firm Value
讲座教师：Rencheng Wang 副教授 澳大利亚墨尔本大学
讲座时间：2018年5月31日（周四）下午3点30分
讲座地点：文泉楼南401我院大会议室
摘要:
We show that shareholder litigation ex ante negatively affects the value of tax avoidance when the interests of the plaintiff’s attorneys are not aligned with those of the shareholders. We further find that this effect increases with attorneys’ incentives to target a firm, attorneys’ attention allocated to a firm, and the compliance costs of tax planning for an industry. Finally, we show that even when the agency problem between shareholders and managers is not severe, attorney self-interest in shareholder litigation continues to discourage managers from engaging in value-enhancing tax avoidance.
讲座专家简介：
Rencheng Wang，上海财经大学本科、密歇根大学硕士，香港科技大学会计学博士，曾任昆士兰大学高级讲师，现任墨尔本大学副教授。代表作如下：
• “Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits.” (With Thomas Bourveau and Yun Lou) 2018. Journal of Accounting Research Forthcoming.
• “Does Accounting Conservatism Mitigate the Shortcomings of CEO Overconfidence?” (with Charles Hsu and Kirill Novoselov) 2017. The Accounting Review 92 (6): 77-101.
• “The Bright Side of Managerial Over-optimism.” (with Gilles Hilary, Charles Hsu, and Benjamin Segal) 2016. Journal of Accounting and Economics 62 (1): 46-64.
• “Management Forecast Consistency.” (With Gilles Hilary and Charles Hsu) 2014. Journal of Accounting Research 52 (1): 163-191.
